Skip to content

Harden it

For: self-hosters putting the server on the internet. At the end: you know what’s locked down already, and the few things that are on you.

  • Containers. Every wow-stats container runs as its own user (uid 10001), on a read-only root filesystem with only /tmp writable, with every Linux capability dropped and no-new-privileges. The image holds Python’s standard library plus two packages (cryptography for the sealed site, FastMCP for the MCP endpoint), no shell needed at run time.
  • Listening. Every published port binds 127.0.0.1. VictoriaLogs has no published port at all: only ui and publish reach it.
  • One view per process. The public view and the full view are separate processes, so a routing mistake can’t hand your full view to a visitor. The public answers are cut to an allow list on the server: a field the code adds later stays private until someone adds it to the list (Privacy tiers).
  • Static sites. Files only: no login, no cookie, no backend call. The sealed site’s data is encrypted, and its key never reaches the server, a log or a proxy.
  • Host names. The page answers only for localhost, IP addresses and the names you set (PUBLIC_URL, MCP_PUBLIC_URL, ALLOWED_HOSTS), so a web page can’t read yours through your browser. AUTH=open refuses to listen beyond loopback unless you say so (ALLOW_OPEN).
  • The page. A strict Content Security Policy (scripts, styles and fonts from the server itself, no third-party code), Referrer-Policy: no-referrer. Outbound links to Wowhead carry no referrer.
  • The MCP. OAuth with PKCE, a consent page per client, tokens bound to your /mcp address, an allow list of known clients, a 1 MiB request limit. Who gets in is checked at every token refresh, against your identity provider’s answer.
  • Uploads. /ingest takes events only with its password, and the server screens every event before storing it.
  • Logs. Never a password, key, token or price.
  1. Keep the ports on 127.0.0.1 and reach them through a reverse proxy with HTTPS (Put it behind a reverse proxy). Never publish VictoriaLogs (9428): it answers anyone, with every event.
  2. Put a login on the full view. UI_AUTH=basic with a long password, or AUTH=proxy behind a login proxy that replaces X-Forwarded-User on every request. With AUTH=proxy the server also needs to know the proxy: PROXY_TRUSTED_CIDRS and/or PROXY_SECRET_FILE. open is only for a port no one else reaches.
  3. Use long random secrets. INGEST_PASSWORD and BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD need 12 characters; use 24 or more. Keep .env at chmod 600. Secrets in files under secrets/ (the _FILE variables) stay out of docker inspect.
  4. Keep MCP_SIGNING_KEY_FILE private and stable. It signs every AI token.
  5. Never route the internal ports: the static server’s upload port, the full view’s share port, the renderer, the exporter’s /metrics (HTTP endpoints, never route these).
  6. Give the renderer nothing. If you run it: no secrets, no route to your stores, out to wow.zamimg.com only. It runs a third-party script in Chromium without a sandbox.
  7. On Kubernetes, add network policies: the static pod has no route out at all, the publisher reaches the stores and the static pod’s upload port, the renderer only Wowhead (Deploy without compose).
  8. Update. Read the changelog and upgrade when a release comes out.

What the security review left open on purpose: Security notes. Found a security problem in wow-stats itself? See SECURITY.md.